it policy is in that case. I'm not even
> sure a bridge can have an exit policy, since it isn't an exit..
Sorry I think I've misunderstood slightly. I thought you were asking
about running Tor itself. I am not familiar with the obfuscating
proxy part of Tor so I don't know how it interacts with exit
policies. I suggest asking the Tor developers.
If it sends packets to the normal Internet like a Tor exit node does
then yes you do need to block ports 25 and 22, but that might be
taken care of by your usual exit policy.
Cheers,
Andy
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Subject: Re: [bitfolk] Tor Obsfucation
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Hey Andy,
The Iranian government have stopped access to SSL and most encrypted
channels, which means it is impossible for my college friends who went
back this year (and the rest of the Iranian population) to connect to
Tor and most anonymizers via normal methods.
Tor have retaliated by releasing an obfuscation proxy which means
people can connect "under the radar".
From hrm@??? Sat Feb 11 16:52:25 2012
Receive
