11 Feb
2012
11 Feb
'12
4:52 p.m.
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 04:38:01PM +0000, Daniel Case wrote:
Hey Andy,
The Iranian government have stopped access to SSL and most encrypted
channels, which means it is impossible for my college friends who went
back this year (and the rest of the Iranian population) to connect to
Tor and most anonymizers via normal methods.
Tor have retaliated by releasing an obfuscation proxy which means
people can connect "under the radar".
The question is not whether it's a good thing for you run this
service for those people. It's about who *else* can use it, and what
they will be doing.
The questions here are:
* If you run this, who can access it?
* If you run it, are there recognisable (i.e. not encrypted by Tor)
packets coming from your machine as a result?
If the answer to those two questions is "anyone" and "yes", then
there is a problem, as your machine will be used as a recognisable
jumping-off point for all manner of activities which are illegal in
_this_ country, and Andy (and hence you) will end up being asked
(politely or otherwise) to turn it off.
If only your friends can use the machine, then it's not likely
going to be a problem, provided you can trust them not to run torrents
or launch spam attacks.
If the node is an intermediate node that simply reroutes Tor
traffic, then that's also not a problem, because you can't be fingered
for the content of the traffic going in and out of the machine, as
it's encrypted.
Hugo.
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